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郭文贵案没收异议裁定及没收发还命令(2026年6月29日)中英对照全文

来源:美国纽约南区联邦地区法院 · 发布于 2026/10/19

美国纽约南区联邦地区法院

美利坚合众国

诉 郭文贵(Ho Wan Kwok,又名 Miles Guo),

案号:23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)

被告。

命令

联邦地区法院法官阿娜莉莎·托雷斯(Analisa Torres):

被告郭文贵对本院于2025年8月11日作出的没收预备令(“POF”)提出异议。参见异议书,电子案卷(ECF)第799号;没收预备令,ECF第720号;政府动议,ECF第716号;答复书,ECF第803号;另见回复书,ECF第804号。基于下述理由,本院对郭文贵就没收预备令提出的异议部分予以支持,部分予以驳回。

背景

本院以读者已知悉本案事实背景为前提,以下仅概述与没收有关的程序及提交的文书。

A. 陪审团裁决

2024年7月16日,陪审团裁定郭文贵犯有9项金融犯罪:(1)1项敲诈勒索共谋罪(第三份替代起诉书第1项罪名);(2)共谋实施电汇欺诈或银行欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪及共谋实施证券欺诈罪各1项(第2、3、4项罪名);(3)与农场借贷计划有关的电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪各1项(第7、8项罪名);(4)与G|CLUBS(“G Clubs”)有关的电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪各1项(第9、10项罪名);(5)与喜马拉雅交易所有关的电汇欺诈罪1项(第11项罪名)。陪审团就与GTV私募发行有关的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈指控各1项,以及实施非法货币交易的指控1项(第5、6、12项罪名),裁定郭文贵无罪。参见陪审团裁决,ECF第395号;第三份替代起诉书,ECF第307号。农场借贷计划、G Clubs、喜马拉雅交易所及GTV私募发行这几项活动,均被指控为“G企业”的组成部分;“G企业”是一系列投资计划,构成第1项罪名所详述的敲诈勒索共谋。参见第三份替代起诉书第16—19段。

B. 适用的没收规定

鉴于郭文贵被定罪,《美国法典》中3项不同规定适用于郭文贵,要求将特定资产没收归政府所有:

1)《美国法典》第18编第1963(a)条,要求被告交出任何“构成该人……从敲诈勒索活动中获得的任何收益,或源自此类收益”的财产予以没收(第1项罪名);

2)《美国法典》第18编第981(a)(1)(C)条,要求被告交出所有“构成可追溯至”欺诈或共谋实施欺诈的“收益,或源自此类收益”的财产予以没收(第2、4、7、8、9、10、11项罪名);〔脚注1〕以及

3)《美国法典》第18编第982(a)(1)条,要求被告交出所有洗钱“所涉”财产,或“可追溯至此类〔洗钱所涉〕财产”的财产予以没收(第3项罪名)。参见同上,第58—61段。

C. 此前提交的文书

2025年4月8日,本院指定郭文贵的现任律师,并命令双方提交联名函,说明郭文贵将于何日就没收问题表明立场。参见4月8日庭审记录第10页第14—23行,ECF第684号。随后,本院应双方及郭文贵的请求,先后4次延长郭文贵就各项资产的没收表明立场的期限。参见例如ECF第698、704、706、708号。此后,郭文贵于2025年6月27日提交函件,称其“无法就政府扣押的款项及财产可能被没收和予以没收发还(remission)的相关问题表明立场”。ECF第710号,第1—2页。该函称,郭文贵“〔并未〕放弃〔其〕在本案中的任何权利,包括上诉权”。同上,第1页。政府在答复函中表示,尽管“郭文贵不同意作出没收预备令,法院仍可作出没收预备令,对郭文贵作出金钱判决,并没收郭文贵在特定财产中的个人权益”。ECF第713号。

1个月后,政府通过日期为2025年7月28日的动议,请求本院“作出没收预备令,载明……〔一项〕金钱判决”,金额为13亿美元。参见《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32(b)(2)(A)条;政府动议。〔脚注2〕政府将这13亿美元界定为“可追溯至实施”敲诈勒索及欺诈各项罪行(第1、2、4、7、8、9、10、11项罪名)的“收益”,以及洗钱罪(第3项罪名)“所涉财产”。参见没收预备令第3页。政府主张,13亿美元是“对……各受害人向G企业某些分支汇入的资金所作的保守估算”,这些分支包括农场借贷计划、GTV、G Clubs及喜马拉雅交易所。政府动议第3页;参见《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(1)(A)条(“如政府请求对个人作出金钱判决,法院必须确定应命令被告支付的金额。”)。

政府还请求没收没收预备令中列明的特定财产(“所列财产”),参见政府动议第4页、没收预备令第3—11页,其中包括“从数个银行账户扣押的现金……〔这些账户〕被用于推进〔郭文贵的〕犯罪及其敲诈勒索企业的活动”;政府称,这些现金属于“G企业〔即第1项罪名所界定的敲诈勒索企业〕的收益以及洗钱所涉财产”(第3项罪名)。政府动议第4—5页。政府按账户被扣押的日期及账户的开户名义对这些银行账户分类;每一账户持有人“均在〔替代〕起诉书中被列为RICO〔《反敲诈勒索及腐败组织法》〕企业的成员”。同上,第4页;参见第三份替代起诉书第3(a)段。政府随附了数份与这些账户有关的扣押令宣誓书。参见政府动议附件B—E,ECF第716-2至716-5号;另见拟议没收预备令第a—u、bb段(列举银行账户),ECF第716-1号。

所列财产包括位于新泽西州马瓦镇拉马波谷路675号的豪宅、“其中物品”,例如一面“带有洛可可式顶饰和交叉网纹饰板的意大利镀金木框镜”,以及其他数件奢侈品,如布加迪、兰博基尼和劳斯莱斯汽车。参见政府动议第5—7页;另见拟议没收预备令第aa段(列举“政府从〔马瓦〕房产扣押的动产”)。政府主张,马瓦房产、其中动产及上述奢侈品均使用可追溯至G Clubs、G企业或洗钱的资金购置。参见政府动议第5—7页。

郭文贵未对政府动议作出回应,且鉴于其已向本院表示“无法就”没收“相关问题表明立场”,本院于2025年8月11日作出没收预备令。参见没收预备令。近1个月后,即2025年9月4日,郭文贵请求给予机会,“就”政府动议中的“缺陷”“作出回应”,例如“某些财产是否可予没收”“抵扣问题”以及“政府所请求总金额的准确性”。参见ECF第724号,第1页。本院通过日期为2026年1月8日的命令,指示郭文贵提交任何异议,并具体说明“〔郭文贵〕是否对任何”所列财产“主张个人权益”。ECF第784号。〔脚注3〕本院现审理郭文贵于2026年2月3日提交的文书。参见异议书。

法律标准

政府以金钱判决形式请求没收时,本院“必须确定应命令被告支付的金额”(《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(1)(A)条),并使用“案卷中已有的证据”(同规则第32.2(b)(1)(B)条),包括庭审记录。参见United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021)。然而,没收金额的计算“并非一门精确科学”。United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011)。因此,本院仅须根据“现有信息”,就适当的没收金额作出“合理估算”。同上;参见同上(另指出,法院在评估拟议金钱判决时,可以“从一般参照点出发”,并“可根据依优势证据标准确立的证据作出合理推算”);另见United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009)。

本院必须依优势证据标准裁定没收问题,既包括适当的金钱判决金额,也包括所列财产是否应予没收。United States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007)。

分析

郭文贵对没收预备令提出数项异议:(1)被指控欺诈的“范围”过于宽泛,涵盖了并非其犯罪受害人的人员;(2)“只能命令其交出本人取得的资产予以没收”;(3)没收不应涵盖任何被指称源自GTV私募发行的收益,因为其就与GTV有关的2项欺诈罪名已被判无罪;(4)金钱判决应抵扣若干款项。参见异议书第3、9、11、17页。

本院认定,政府已依优势证据标准证明,约8.89亿美元是对流入农场借贷计划、G Clubs和喜马拉雅交易所的现金总额所作的合理估算;这些计划或企业,或为郭文贵被定罪的敲诈勒索共谋的组成部分,或为其欺诈定罪所依据的企业,因此,8.89亿美元是本案适当的金钱判决金额。参见政府动议第3页;GXZ26,ECF第803-1号;庭审记录第4330—4332页;〔脚注4〕《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32(b)(1)(A)条。

A. 范围

郭文贵主张,有些个人声称“并未受到”其欺诈“侵害”,可追溯至这些个人所提供“收益”的财产不应列入没收预备令;本院驳回此项主张。参见异议书第3—4、5页。

郭文贵的论证以没收须区分“受欺诈的投资者与坚持认为自己未受欺诈的投资者”为前提。异议书第4页。没收并不作此区分。本案中的没收适用于“来自敲诈勒索活动”的收益、来自“欺诈”的收益以及洗钱“所涉”财产。参见答复书第5页(援引《美国法典》第18编第1963(a)、981(a)(1)(C)及982(a)(2)条)。与郭文贵的主张相反,其被定罪罪行的范围,并非由个别受害人对其陈述的“预期和信赖”所界定。比较异议书第5页(主张“个别投资者的预期和信赖,是区分欺诈受害人与未受侵害者的关键”)。

事实上,第二巡回上诉法院已裁定,“信赖并非刑事欺诈的构成要件”,且“欺诈受害人信赖(或不信赖)虚假陈述是否不合理,与被告的犯罪故意无关”。United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2017)。即使欺诈计划中所谓的“投资者”否认曾信赖构成欺诈基础的虚假陈述,欺诈计划仍可能成立,而从该计划取得的全部收益均应予没收。同样,“投资者”对于自身是否为该计划受害人的主观看法,并不影响其投入该计划的资金是否属于被告从欺诈中取得的“收益”。决定性因素仅在于“重大性”,即被指控具有欺诈性的陈述,是否“具有影响其所针对决策者的自然倾向”。Weaver, 860 F.3d at 96。重大性应依客观标准评估,“而非从受害人的主观角度”判断。United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017)。

郭文贵被判有罪的欺诈罪行的法定定义,进一步印证了本院的结论。电汇欺诈罪将明知而参与任何“欺诈计划或手段”,并“为实施此类〔欺诈〕计划或手段”而通过电信传输特定通信的行为规定为犯罪。《美国法典》第18编第1343条;参见2024年7月9日庭审记录第5791页第25行至第5794页第6行,ECF第450号。就证券欺诈而言,本案所违反的美国证券交易委员会(“SEC”)规则,参见第三份替代起诉书第47、51段,禁止使用“欺诈……计划”、“作出有关重大事实的不实陈述”或在特定情形下遗漏重大事实,亦禁止“从事对任何人构成或将构成欺诈或欺骗的行为、做法或业务活动”。《联邦法规汇编》第17编第240.10b-5(a)—(c)条(着重号为本院所加)。另见Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999)(指出国会在欺诈法规中禁止的是“‘欺诈计划’,而非已经完成的欺诈”)。因此,郭文贵欺诈计划的“范围”,并不取决于每一位向该计划投入资金的人是否认为自己受到欺诈。他们对于个人“投资”是否具有实质价值,或是否实际信赖任何重大虚假陈述的看法,均不影响这些投资是否投向了欺诈计划。〔脚注5〕

郭文贵援引的United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993)及United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024)两案,均与本案情形不符。在Miller案中,第二巡回上诉法院裁定,根据邮政欺诈审判中呈现的事实,政府未能证明被告意图剥夺受害人的财产权益,因为被告被指从受害人处转作“自身利益”的财产,实际上原本就不是属于受害人的“一项特定、可识别的财产权益”。同上,第1017—1021页。Miller案最终取决于所谓受害人的合同财产权益范围,而非其预期或认知,因此与本案无关。参见同上。在Rainford案中,地区法院仅以“政府的一面之词”为依据作出没收令,上诉法院因而撤销该令并发回重审。110 F.4th at 489。本案则有充分证据支持已入卷的没收预备令。

郭文贵另主张,“有充分证据表明,相当数量的所谓‘受害人’不接受这一身份认定”。异议书第6—7页。郭文贵称,“喜马拉雅交易所的6,512名会员”“已对没收其账户提出异议”,并“对被贴上受害人的标签表示不满”;郭文贵因该企业的相关行为,被判第11项电汇欺诈罪名成立。同上,第6页。这些意见,以及“Hamilton申请人”和其他各类第三方的意见,均不影响本命令;本命令仅审理政府指明的财产事实上是否属于敲诈勒索活动的收益、欺诈收益,或可追溯至洗钱所涉资金,以及13亿美元的金钱判决是否为对郭文贵没收义务金额所作的合理估算。〔脚注6〕第三方就没收预备令所列财产主张的权利,应依《美国法典》第18编第853(n)条及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2条,通过附属程序审查。

B. 占有

郭文贵主张,“仅在其曾于某一时点亲自取得涉案收益的范围内,方可令其承担没收该等收益价值的责任”,并基于多项理由认为,尚无充分证据证明其“取得”了没收预备令列明的财产。异议书第10—11页(着重号为原文所有)。

郭文贵误解了没收的性质。被告犯罪收益可予没收,并不要求相关财产“由被告、其受让人或其共谋者亲自或直接占有”。United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2012)(引注略)。该财产只须“在某一时点曾受被告控制”。同上。此外,即使被告仅暂时控制财产,该财产仍可予没收。参见United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019)。

庭审中,政府已依优势证据标准证明,郭文贵是掌控G企业全部实体及其资产的“老板”。答复书第7页。〔脚注7〕例如,多名证人的证言表明郭文贵对G企业所涉资产行使控制权:卡琳·迈斯特雷洛(Karin Maistrello)作证称,郭文贵控制法治组织的资金,该计划属于G企业的一部分(参见庭审记录第424页);多名证人作证称,郭文贵控制G Clubs(参见庭审记录第1941页〔称郭文贵为“最高老板”〕、第1995页第3—15行、第1996页第2—5行〔在法官席旁作出的澄清〕、第1999页第4—7行、第2975页第8行至第2976页第10行、第2980页第11—22行、第2999页第20行至第3000页第6行〔有关G Clubs的证言〕);另有大量书证支持郭文贵对其犯罪所涉资金行使控制权的结论(参见GXC415;答复书第7页脚注3〔援引显示郭文贵对G企业所涉资金行使控制权的庭审证物〕)。〔脚注8〕

庭审中出示的书证,例如GXZ26(显示从G企业某些银行账户流向没收预备令所列其他银行账户的现金流),亦证明政府主张应予没收的特定账户中,包含源自G企业收益的资金及洗钱所涉财产。参见动议第4—5页。郭文贵并未主张这些账户内存在并非源自G企业所涉实体的资金。参见没收预备令第a—z、bb段;异议书第9—11页(仅主张其本人未取得或控制这些资金)。

郭文贵主要依据Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017)一案,支持其关于不得命令其“交出本人〔未〕取得的资产予以没收”的主张。异议书第9页。在该案中,最高法院裁定,《美国法典》第21编第853条虽然要求没收源自某些毒品犯罪收益的任何财产,但并不自动使共谋中所有被定罪者承担连带责任。参见581 U.S. at 443。

在Honeycutt案中,政府请求对被告作出金钱判决,主张其应对共谋活动的全部利润承担责任,尽管该被告仅为一名领薪雇员,曾协助其所在商店参与毒品犯罪,却从未从该商店相应的涉案利润中受益,更未对其行使控制权。参见同上,第445—447页。而在本案中,本院依优势证据标准认定,郭文贵曾从政府主张应予没收的资金中受益,并对其行使控制权。参见例如答复书第7—8页脚注3(援引庭审证据,其中例如指出,郭文贵指示共谋者使用“G-Club或另一家私人公司”的资金购买一张昂贵的咖啡桌)。事实上,自Honeycutt案以来,第二巡回上诉法院已重申,适用没收不要求政府证明被告曾亲自保有或直接占有财产。参见例如Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018)(裁定即使被告仅暂时有权支配相关资金,而资金随后已拨付,仍可就该资金对被告作出没收令)。

因此,本院认定,政府已依优势证据标准证明,所列财产应予没收。

C. GTV私募发行及美国证券交易委员会要求的吐出非法所得

郭文贵主张,源自GTV私募发行的资金不应列入没收令,且对其作出的金钱判决,应扣除政府指称涉及GTV的资金金额。参见异议书第17页。〔脚注9〕郭文贵认为,由于其就与GTV私募发行有关的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈罪名已被判无罪,政府请求没收的、源自GTV私募发行的4.11亿美元,应从没收令中剔除。同上,第11—12页;答复书第8页。

鉴于双方提出的另一问题,即对郭文贵作出的金钱判决是否应扣除美国证券交易委员会已在行政程序中追回的金额,本院无须裁定上述问题。参见美国证券交易委员会命令,ECF第799-2号。郭文贵称,GTV已在美国证券交易委员会发起的行政程序中吐出非法所得逾4.11亿美元。参见异议书第17—18页。政府对此部分认可,称“GTV私募发行产生的实际资金,已由美国证券交易委员会追回;该委员会设立了公平基金,用于向受害人分配”,并表示“如本院从没收金额中扣除GTV私募发行资金,将扣除约4.11亿美元”。动议第4页脚注2。

但双方提出的金额并不一致。郭文贵主张,GTV连同Saraca Media Group, Inc.和Voice of Guo Media, Inc.已向美国证券交易委员会吐出非法所得逾4.86亿美元,且由于该款项涉及本案起诉的行为,应从金钱判决中扣除全部4.86亿美元。参见异议书第18页。政府则主张,13亿美元中仅4.11亿美元源自GTV私募发行,其余8.89亿美元源自可追溯至农场借贷计划、G Clubs或喜马拉雅交易所的收益。参见GXZ26。GTV及其他实体吐出非法所得的金额比4.11亿美元多出7,500万美元这一事实,仅在该额外7,500万美元可追溯至本案所涉欺诈计划,即农场借贷计划、G Clubs或喜马拉雅交易所的收益时,才与金钱判决有关。

郭文贵主张,所称超出4.11亿美元的7,500万美元吐出非法所得款项,可追溯至其被定罪的罪行;本院驳回该主张。郭文贵首先称,吐出非法所得总额中有3,400万美元涉及“G币和G美元”的销售,这两者是喜马拉雅交易所的早期前身。参见异议书第17—18页。然而,起诉书并未涵盖2020年4月至6月销售G币和G美元的行为,其针对的是2021年至2023年间发生的喜马拉雅交易所企业交易。参见第三份替代起诉书第53段。

此外,郭文贵并未提供证据证明,归于Voice of Guo Media, Inc.(“VOG”)的1.15亿美元吐出非法所得款项“与所谓农场借贷计划重叠”。异议书第17—18页。美国证券交易委员会命令记载,VOG汇集了希望向GTV投资少于100,000美元的“潜在投资者”的资金。参见异议书第17—18页;美国证券交易委员会命令第15—21段,ECF第799-2号。但起诉书对农场借贷计划的描述,与美国证券交易委员会命令对VOG募资活动的描述存在重大差异。例如,比较第三份替代起诉书第17段(将“喜马拉雅农场联盟”描述为“分布于世界各地城市的非正式团体〔各称为‘农场’〕的集合”,其“以向农场提供‘借款’的形式”取得投资,并通过“借款协议”“承诺该等借款可转换为GTV普通股”)与美国证券交易委员会命令第16—18段(描述VOG如何向投资者提供一页纸的“有限目的代理协议”,规定VOG的一名代表收取极少对价,作为投资者的“代理人”代其购买GTV股票)。

郭文贵指出,美国证券交易委员会从GTV及关联公司取得的款项比4.11亿美元多出7,500万美元,这一点虽属实,但其未能证明这笔超出部分与政府已证明关联于郭文贵被定罪罪行的任何收益重合,即关联于农场借贷计划、G Clubs及喜马拉雅交易所的收益。

因此,本院认定,仅可从拟议金钱判决中扣除4.11亿美元,因为案卷表明——且政府并无异议——可追溯至GTV私募发行的4.11亿美元,在本刑事案件启动前,已由G企业的关联实体在另行程序中以吐出非法所得的方式缴付。此项扣除不影响任何所列财产的没收。

D. 抵扣

郭文贵主张,金钱判决金额应“扣除政府就本案已持有的逾10亿美元”,并抵扣“破产受托人持有且属于政府认为在本案可予没收项目的资金及资产”。异议书第18—20页。政府答复指出,在所有第三方权益均经裁判后,“根据没收终局令没收归美国所有”的财产价值,确实“将用于清偿金钱判决”,但对于没收预备令未涵盖的资产,并无法律依据命令予以抵扣。参见答复书第10页及脚注7;没收预备令第7段。〔脚注10〕因此,本院目前不会从金钱判决中扣除任何所列财产的价值。〔脚注11〕

E. 附带事项

郭文贵还请求作出命令,指示政府从其破产财产的第11章破产受托人处接管若干资产(“破产资产”);该破产程序于2022年2月15日在康涅狄格地区启动。参见扣押动议,ECF第724号,第1页;概括参见In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. 2022年2月15日);In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026)。郭文贵主张,政府对被没收资产的权益“优先于破产程序中任何债权人的权益”(扣押动议第5页);命令政府扣押破产资产,既可“将这些资产用于本案所涉各实体的投资者,且法院将命令向其作出刑事退赔”,又可“制止受托人在破产程序中产生的大量费用及开支继续累积”。参见同上,第5—7页。

本院无权准予郭文贵请求的救济。〔脚注12〕郭文贵仅援引《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(3)条,主张本院“可在”没收预备令中“列入……在任何上诉待决期间为保全财产价值而合理必要的条件”。参见扣押动议回复书第4页,ECF第754号。第32.2(b)(3)条将本院的权限限于在“上诉”期间保全财产价值所需的条件,而非在相关但独立的程序——如本案涉及的破产程序——待决期间保全价值所需的条件。

此外,没收规则的其他数项程序性规定也表明,作出此类命令将超出本院权限。例如,第32.2(b)(3)条在没收预备令作出后,“授权”政府“扣押应予没收的特定财产”,但并未要求政府必须实施扣押。《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(3)条。第32.2条也未规定,政府依第32.2(b)(3)条获得授权后,可于何时或以何种方式扣押没收令所列财产。同样,《美国法典》第21编第853(e)及(f)条赋予本院权力,可就可能应予没收的资产采取特定保护措施,但未授权本院强制政府实施扣押。参见答复书第4页。

此外,郭文贵的请求并无实质依据。郭文贵主张,本院可以施加“在任何上诉待决期间为保全财产价值而合理必要”的条件(扣押动议回复书第4页),但第32.2条并未要求本院必须如此行事。本院承认,该破产程序中的第11章破产财产已产生应付受托人及其他各类专业人员的费用,参见扣押动议第7页;但鉴于该程序极为复杂,此类费用并不罕见。参见同上(称破产程序中已提起300起对抗诉讼)。

F. 刑事退赔

政府请求本院认定,作出刑事退赔令不具可行性,并授权进行没收发还程序。参见政府函第4—5页,ECF第785号;ECF第784号(2026年1月8日命令)。郭文贵表示同意。ECF第789号,第3页。本院亦予同意,并根据本案大量案卷记录认定,鉴于“本案的复杂性及所涉受害人的人数”,依《美国法典》第18编第3663A条向受害人判给刑事退赔并不现实,且会使量刑程序复杂化或延长该程序。参见《美国法典》第18编第3663(c)(3)(A)—(B)条。

结论

基于上述理由,本院认定,政府已证明,鉴于郭文贵被判敲诈勒索共谋罪、电汇欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪及共谋洗钱罪成立,所列财产应予没收。本院在以下范围内支持郭文贵的异议:从拟议的13亿美元金钱判决中扣除4.11亿美元,没收终局令中的金钱判决金额据此应为8.89亿美元。

本院驳回郭文贵载于ECF第724号的动议,该动议请求作出命令,强制政府扣押破产程序中的资产。兹指示法院书记官将ECF第724号动议作结案处理。

本院另认定,本案刑事退赔不具可行性,并授权政府通过没收发还程序补偿受害人。

特此命令。

日期:2026年6月29日 纽约州纽约市

脚注1:起诉书在此项没收指控中还援引《美国法典》第28编第2461(c)条,该条规定了与没收有关的进一步规则及程序。参见第三份替代起诉书第59段。

脚注2:在依法须实行刑事没收的案件中,法院可以作出金钱判决。如果被告资产或可识别财产不足以涵盖没收法规要求其交出予以没收的全部收益,可通过金钱判决确保被告对该全部收益承担责任。参见例如United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)(“如被告缺乏足以履行该命令的资产,法院可作出有利于政府的没收金钱判决。”);United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)(在依据《美国法典》第18编第982(a)(2)条请求没收的案件中,维持金钱判决);United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010)(在依据《美国法典》第28编第2461条请求没收的案件中,维持金钱判决)。

脚注3:政府主张,郭文贵已放弃对没收预备令提出任何异议,主要依据是郭文贵在2025年6月27日的函中称,其不就没收表明立场。参见例如答复书第3—4页。本院1月8日的命令未处理权利放弃问题;鉴于本院在本命令中基本认定郭文贵对没收预备令的质疑缺乏实质依据,且本院倾向于就实体问题作出裁断,故不对郭文贵是否已放弃异议发表意见。

脚注4:郭文贵在量刑意见书中主张,证物GXZ26未考虑G企业各组成部分之间流入资金可能被重复计算的问题。参见例如ECF第822号,第41、53页(主张个人可以使用喜马拉雅交易所资金购买G Clubs会员资格);另见ECF第826号(更正量刑意见书)。郭文贵未援引任何证据表明此类情况确已发生,或表明政府计算流入资金时,确实不当计入了从喜马拉雅交易所账户向G Clubs投入的资金。同上。因此,本院根据案卷中现有证据作出本项认定;该证据表明政府的计算正确。而且,无论如何,郭文贵在对没收令提出的异议中未提出此项论点。故本院不予审理此项异议。

脚注5:郭文贵并未提出相反主张——其提交文书中提出本项论点的部分,既未讨论,甚至未援引其被定罪的欺诈罪行的构成要件。参见异议书第4—9页。

脚注6:本院知悉,已有大量申请依据《美国法典》第18编第853(n)条提出,旨在就没收归美国所有的财产主张第三方法律权益;对于任何申请人依第853(n)条适当提出并提交的权利主张是否成立,本院不发表意见。

脚注7:此外,依据本案作为没收依据的各项法规,本院仅须认定郭文贵“直接或间接”取得收益。参见《美国法典》第18编第1963(a)(3)、981(a)(2)(A)、982(a)(2)条。

脚注8:郭文贵关于庭审记录的唯一论点是,某证人“作证称……郭文贵并非G Clubs的最终实益拥有人,也不是G Clubs或G Fashion的资金来源”。异议书第10—11页。该证人小詹姆斯·R·柯林斯(James R. Collins Jr.)是Mercantile Global Holdings的雇员;该公司拥有一家银行,该银行与G Clubs、G Fashion和喜马拉雅交易所保持客户关系。参见庭审记录第2753页第8行至第2756页第15行。但柯林斯仅作证称,Mercantile Bank认为郭文贵并非G Clubs的最终实益拥有人,且G Clubs曾向其作出此种表示。参见庭审记录第2758页第23行至第2762页第12行。其并未就G Clubs内部运作的任何亲身了解作证,也未就郭文贵事实上是否控制G Clubs资金作证。因此,本院对柯林斯证言赋予的证明力极低。郭文贵还试图通过援引,将第三方提出的论点纳入其主张;这些第三方已依据《美国法典》第21编第853(n)条,就应予没收的资产提出附属权利请求。参见异议书第11页。本院将在量刑后依第853(n)条及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2条进行的附属程序中审理这些论点。本院不对任何第三方是否就任何被没收财产享有优先法律权益发表意见。

脚注9:郭文贵并未主张某一特定银行账户或动产项目仅构成GTV私募发行的收益,概括参见异议书。政府坚持认为,所有相关资金均为G企业的收益及洗钱所涉财产。参见动议第4—5页。郭文贵未主张应以此为由将任何所列财产排除在没收范围之外,因此,本院仅审查吐出非法所得对金钱判决的影响。

脚注10:郭文贵还主张,如果本院在附属程序中认定某项财产属于第三方,应从金钱判决中扣除该财产价值。异议书第18页。此项主张不成立。第三方没收程序旨在确定第三方是否对应予没收的财产享有优先法律权益。参见《美国法典》第21编第853(n)(6)条;政府没收事宜函第1—2页,ECF第785号。这与资产是否可予没收属于不同问题。即使第三方对财产享有优先法律权益,该财产仍可能已因欺诈等原因落入郭文贵控制之下。因此,如本院依《美国法典》第21编第853(n)(6)条认定某项财产属于第三方,也不会从金钱判决中扣除该财产的价值。

脚注11:本院驳回郭文贵提出的以下请求:按照“政府未追索本案其他可能可予没收资产的范围”减少金钱判决金额,以及按海瑟姆·哈立德(Haithem Khaled)被没收的金额减少金钱判决金额。参见异议书第19—21页。郭文贵未为上述任何一项请求提供法律依据。

脚注12:对于政府关于郭文贵就此问题不具诉讼资格的主张,本院不发表意见。

美国纽约南区联邦地区法院UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

美利坚合众国UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

诉 郭文贵(Ho Wan Kwok,又名 Miles Guo),-againstMILES GUO,

案号:23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)

被告。Defendant.

命令ORDER

联邦地区法院法官阿娜莉莎·托雷斯(Analisa Torres):ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:

被告郭文贵对本院于2025年8月11日作出的没收预备令(“POF”)提出异议。

Defendant, Miles Guo, objects to the preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) entered by the Court on August 11, 2025.

参见异议书,电子案卷(ECF)第799号;没收预备令,ECF第720号;政府动议,ECF第716号;答复书,ECF第803号;另见回复书,ECF第804号。

See Objs., ECF No. 799; POF, ECF No. 720; Gov’t Mot., ECF No. 716; Resp., ECF No. 803; see also Reply, ECF No. 804.

基于下述理由,本院对郭文贵就没收预备令提出的异议部分予以支持,部分予以驳回。

For the reasons stated below, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Guo’s objections to the POF.

背景BACKGROUND

本院以读者已知悉本案事实背景为前提,以下仅概述与没收有关的程序及提交的文书。

The Court presumes familiarity with the factual background of the case and recounts only a summary of forfeiture-related proceedings and submissions here.

A. 陪审团裁决A. Jury Verdict

2024年7月16日,陪审团裁定郭文贵犯有9项金融犯罪:(1)1项敲诈勒索共谋罪(第三份替代起诉书第1项罪名);(2)共谋实施电汇欺诈或银行欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪及共谋实施证券欺诈罪各1项(第2、3、4项罪名);(3)与农场借贷计划有关的电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪各1项(第7、8项罪名);(4)与G|CLUBS(“G Clubs”)有关的电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪各1项(第9、10项罪名);(5)与喜马拉雅交易所有关的电汇欺诈罪1项(第11项罪名)。

On July 16, 2024, a jury convicted Guo of nine counts of various financial crimes: (1) one count of racketeering conspiracy (Count One of the third superseding indictment); (2) one count each of conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud, money laundering, and securities fraud (Counts Two, Three, and Four); (3) one count each of wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with the Farm Loan Program (Counts Seven and Eight); (4) one count each of wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with G|CLUBS (“G Clubs”) (Counts Nine and Ten); (5) and one count of wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count Eleven).

陪审团就与GTV私募发行有关的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈指控各1项,以及实施非法货币交易的指控1项(第5、6、12项罪名),裁定郭文贵无罪。

The jury acquitted Guo of one count each of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private Placement and one count of committing an unlawful monetary transaction (Counts Five, Six, and Twelve).

参见陪审团裁决,ECF第395号;第三份替代起诉书,ECF第307号。

See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 395; S3 Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 307.

农场借贷计划、G Clubs、喜马拉雅交易所及GTV私募发行这几项活动,均被指控为“G企业”的组成部分;“G企业”是一系列投资计划,构成第1项罪名所详述的敲诈勒索共谋。

Each of these activities—the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, the Himalaya Exchange, and the GTV Private Placement—were alleged to be components of the “G Enterprise,” a series of investment schemes comprising the racketeering conspiracy detailed in Count One.

参见第三份替代起诉书第16—19段。

See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 16–19.

B. 适用的没收规定B. Applicable Forfeiture Provisions

鉴于郭文贵被定罪,《美国法典》中3项不同规定适用于郭文贵,要求将特定资产没收归政府所有:

As a result of Guo’s convictions, he is subject to three distinct provisions of the United States Code which call for forfeiture of certain assets to the Government:

1)《美国法典》第18编第1963(a)条,要求被告交出任何“构成该人……从敲诈勒索活动中获得的任何收益,或源自此类收益”的财产予以没收(第1项罪名);

1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), which requires a defendant to forfeit any property “constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained . . . from racketeering activity” (Count One);

2)《美国法典》第18编第981(a)(1)(C)条,要求被告交出所有“构成可追溯至”欺诈或共谋实施欺诈的“收益,或源自此类收益”的财产予以没收(第2、4、7、8、9、10、11项罪名);〔脚注1〕以及

2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to” fraud or a conspiracy to commit fraud (Counts Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven);1 and

3)《美国法典》第18编第982(a)(1)条,要求被告交出所有洗钱“所涉”财产,或“可追溯至此类〔洗钱所涉〕财产”的财产予以没收(第3项罪名)。

3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “involved” in money laundering, or “traceable to such property [involved in money laundering]” (Count Three).

参见同上,第58—61段。

See id. ¶¶ 58–61.

C. 此前提交的文书C. Prior Submissions

2025年4月8日,本院指定郭文贵的现任律师,并命令双方提交联名函,说明郭文贵将于何日就没收问题表明立场。

On April 8, 2025, the Court appointed Guo’s present counsel and ordered the parties to provide a joint letter stating the date when Guo would provide his position with respect to forfeiture.

参见4月8日庭审记录第10页第14—23行,ECF第684号。

See Apr. 8 Tr. at 10:14–23, ECF No. 684.

随后,本院应双方及郭文贵的请求,先后4次延长郭文贵就各项资产的没收表明立场的期限。

The Court subsequently granted four extensions, at the parties’ and at Guo’s request, for Guo to articulate his position on the forfeiture of various assets.

参见例如ECF第698、704、706、708号。

See, e.g., ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708.

此后,郭文贵于2025年6月27日提交函件,称其“无法就政府扣押的款项及财产可能被没收和予以没收发还(remission)的相关问题表明立场”。

Then, on June 27, 2025, Guo filed a letter claiming that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding potential forfeiture and remission of money and property seized by the Government.”

ECF第710号,第1—2页。

ECF No. 710 at 1– 2.

该函称,郭文贵“〔并未〕放弃〔其〕在本案中的任何权利,包括上诉权”。

The letter stated Guo “[did] not waive any of [his] rights, including his appellate rights, in this case.”

同上,第1页。

Id. at 1.

政府在答复函中表示,尽管“郭文贵不同意作出没收预备令,法院仍可作出没收预备令,对郭文贵作出金钱判决,并没收郭文贵在特定财产中的个人权益”。

In response, the Government wrote that although “Guo is not consenting to a preliminary order of forfeiture, the Court can enter a preliminary order of forfeiture that imposes a money judgment and forfeits Guo’s personal interest in specific property.”

ECF第713号。

ECF No. 713.

1个月后,政府通过日期为2025年7月28日的动议,请求本院“作出没收预备令,载明……〔一项〕金钱判决”,金额为13亿美元。

A month later, by motion dated July 28, 2025, the Government asked the Court to “enter a preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth . . . [a] money judgment” in the amount of $1.3 billion.

参见《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32(b)(2)(A)条;政府动议。〔脚注2〕

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2)(A); Gov’t Mot.2

政府将这13亿美元界定为“可追溯至实施”敲诈勒索及欺诈各项罪行(第1、2、4、7、8、9、10、11项罪名)的“收益”,以及洗钱罪(第3项罪名)“所涉财产”。

The Government characterized the $1.3 billion as “the proceeds traceable to the commission” of the racketeering and fraud counts (Counts One, Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven) and “the property involved” in the money laundering offense (Count Three).

参见没收预备令第3页。

See POF at 3.

政府主张,13亿美元是“对……各受害人向G企业某些分支汇入的资金所作的保守估算”,这些分支包括农场借贷计划、GTV、G Clubs及喜马拉雅交易所。

The Government argued that $1.3 billion is a “conservative estimate of the . . . funds sent by individual victims to certain arms of the G Enterprise,” which included the Farm Loan Program, GTV, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange.

政府动议第3页;参见《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(1)(A)条(“如政府请求对个人作出金钱判决,法院必须确定应命令被告支付的金额。”)。

Gov’t Mot. at 3; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the government seeks a personal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay.”).

政府还请求没收没收预备令中列明的特定财产(“所列财产”),参见政府动议第4页、没收预备令第3—11页,其中包括“从数个银行账户扣押的现金……〔这些账户〕被用于推进〔郭文贵的〕犯罪及其敲诈勒索企业的活动”;政府称,这些现金属于“G企业〔即第1项罪名所界定的敲诈勒索企业〕的收益以及洗钱所涉财产”(第3项罪名)。

The Government also sought the forfeiture of certain property listed in the POF (the “Listed Property”), Gov’t Mot. at 4; POF at 3–11: “cash seized from several bank accounts . . . used in furtherance of [Guo’s] crimes and his racketeering enterprise,” which, according to the Government, represent “proceeds of the G Enterprise [(the racketeering enterprise defined in Count One)] and property involved in money laundering” (Count Three).

政府动议第4—5页。

Gov’t Mot. at 4–5.

政府按账户被扣押的日期及账户的开户名义对这些银行账户分类;每一账户持有人“均在〔替代〕起诉书中被列为RICO〔《反敲诈勒索及腐败组织法》〕企业的成员”。

The Government categorized these bank accounts based on the date they were seized by the Government and the names in which the accounts were held; each of the account holders “was named in the [superseding] [i]ndictment as a member of the RICO enterprise.”

同上,第4页;参见第三份替代起诉书第3(a)段。

Id. at 4; see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 3(a).

政府随附了数份与这些账户有关的扣押令宣誓书。

The Government attached several seizure warrant affidavits related to these accounts.

参见政府动议附件B—E,ECF第716-2至716-5号;另见拟议没收预备令第a—u、bb段(列举银行账户),ECF第716-1号。

See Gov’t Mot. Exs. B–E, ECF Nos. 716-2 through 716-5; see also Proposed POF ¶¶ a–u, bb (listing bank accounts), ECF No. 716-1.

所列财产包括位于新泽西州马瓦镇拉马波谷路675号的豪宅、“其中物品”,例如一面“带有洛可可式顶饰和交叉网纹饰板的意大利镀金木框镜”,以及其他数件奢侈品,如布加迪、兰博基尼和劳斯莱斯汽车。

The Listed Property included a mansion located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road in Mahwah, New Jersey, “its contents,” including, for example, an “Italian giltwood mirror with rococo crest with cross-hatched panels,” and several other luxury items, such as a Bugatti, Lamborghini, and Rolls-Royce.

参见政府动议第5—7页;另见拟议没收预备令第aa段(列举“政府从〔马瓦〕房产扣押的动产”)。

See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7; see also Proposed POF ¶ aa (listing “personal property seized by the Government from the [Mahwah] property”).

政府主张,马瓦房产、其中动产及上述奢侈品均使用可追溯至G Clubs、G企业或洗钱的资金购置。

The Government argued that the Mahwah property, the personal property therein, and the luxury items were purchased with funds traceable to G Clubs, the G Enterprise, or money laundering.

参见政府动议第5—7页。

See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7.

郭文贵未对政府动议作出回应,且鉴于其已向本院表示“无法就”没收“相关问题表明立场”,本院于2025年8月11日作出没收预备令。

Guo did not respond to the Government’s motion, and given that he had represented to the Court that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding” forfeiture, on August 11, 2025, the Court entered the POF.

参见没收预备令。

See POF.

近1个月后,即2025年9月4日,郭文贵请求给予机会,“就”政府动议中的“缺陷”“作出回应”,例如“某些财产是否可予没收”“抵扣问题”以及“政府所请求总金额的准确性”。

Nearly a month later, on September 4, 2025, Guo requested an opportunity “to address” “deficiencies” in the Government’s motion, such as “whether certain property is forfeitable,” “the issue of offsets,” and “the accuracy of the total amount the government seeks.”

参见ECF第724号,第1页。

See ECF No. 724 at 1.

本院通过日期为2026年1月8日的命令,指示郭文贵提交任何异议,并具体说明“〔郭文贵〕是否对任何”所列财产“主张个人权益”。

By order dated January 8, 2026, the Court directed Guo to file any objections and to specify “whether [Guo] claims a personal interest in any of” the Listed Property.

ECF第784号。〔脚注3〕

ECF No. 784.3

本院现审理郭文贵于2026年2月3日提交的文书。

Before the Court is Guo’s February 3, 2026 submission.

参见异议书。

See Objs.

法律标准LEGAL STANDARD

政府以金钱判决形式请求没收时,本院“必须确定应命令被告支付的金额”(《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(1)(A)条),并使用“案卷中已有的证据”(同规则第32.2(b)(1)(B)条),包括庭审记录。

When the Government seeks forfeiture in the form of a money judgment, the Court “must determine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A), using “evidence already in the record,” id. 32.2(b)(1)(B), including the trial record.

参见United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021)。

See United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021).

然而,没收金额的计算“并非一门精确科学”。

The calculation of a forfeiture amount, however, “is not an exact science.”

United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011)。

United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011).

因此,本院仅须根据“现有信息”,就适当的没收金额作出“合理估算”。

As a result, the Court need only make a “reasonable estimate” based on “available information” concerning the appropriate amount of forfeiture.

同上;参见同上(另指出,法院在评估拟议金钱判决时,可以“从一般参照点出发”,并“可根据依优势证据标准确立的证据作出合理推算”);另见United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009)。

Id.; see id. (noting, additionally, that a court may “use general points of reference as a starting point” and “may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence” in evaluating a proposed money judgment); see also United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009).

本院必须依优势证据标准裁定没收问题,既包括适当的金钱判决金额,也包括所列财产是否应予没收。

The Court must determine forfeiture—both the proper money judgment amount and whether forfeiture applies to the Listed Property—by a preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007)。

United States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007).

分析DISCUSSION

郭文贵对没收预备令提出数项异议:(1)被指控欺诈的“范围”过于宽泛,涵盖了并非其犯罪受害人的人员;(2)“只能命令其交出本人取得的资产予以没收”;(3)没收不应涵盖任何被指称源自GTV私募发行的收益,因为其就与GTV有关的2项欺诈罪名已被判无罪;(4)金钱判决应抵扣若干款项。

Guo raises several objections to the POF: (1) the “scope” of his alleged fraud is overbroad and includes those who were not victims of his crimes; (2) he “can only be ordered to forfeit assets that he personally obtained”; (3) forfeiture should not cover any alleged proceeds from the GTV Private Placement because he was acquitted of two fraud counts related to GTV; and (4) the money judgment should be offset by certain amounts.

参见异议书第3、9、11、17页。

See Objs. at 3, 9, 11, 17.

本院认定,政府已依优势证据标准证明,约8.89亿美元是对流入农场借贷计划、G Clubs和喜马拉雅交易所的现金总额所作的合理估算;这些计划或企业,或为郭文贵被定罪的敲诈勒索共谋的组成部分,或为其欺诈定罪所依据的企业,因此,8.89亿美元是本案适当的金钱判决金额。

The Court finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that approximately $889 million is a reasonable estimate of the gross inflows of cash into the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange—all either components of the racketeering conspiracy of which Guo was convicted or enterprises which formed the basis of his fraud convictions—and that $889 million is, therefore, the proper money judgment amount in this case.

参见政府动议第3页;GXZ26,ECF第803-1号;庭审记录第4330—4332页;〔脚注4〕《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32(b)(1)(A)条。

See Gov’t Mot. at 3; GXZ26, ECF No. 803-1; Trial Tr. at 4330–32; 4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1)(A).

A. 范围A. Scope

郭文贵主张,有些个人声称“并未受到”其欺诈“侵害”,可追溯至这些个人所提供“收益”的财产不应列入没收预备令;本院驳回此项主张。

The Court rejects Guo’s argument that the POF should not include property traceable to “proceeds” from individuals who claim they “were not victimized” by his fraud.

参见异议书第3—4、5页。

See Objs. at 3– 4, 5.

郭文贵的论证以没收须区分“受欺诈的投资者与坚持认为自己未受欺诈的投资者”为前提。

As an initial matter, Guo assumes that forfeiture distinguishes between “investors who were defrauded, and those who insist they were not.”

异议书第4页。

Objs. at 4.

没收并不作此区分。

It does not.

本案中的没收适用于“来自敲诈勒索活动”的收益、来自“欺诈”的收益以及洗钱“所涉”财产。

Forfeiture, in this case, applies to proceeds “from racketeering activity,” proceeds from “fraud,” and property “involved in” money laundering.

参见答复书第5页(援引《美国法典》第18编第1963(a)、981(a)(1)(C)及982(a)(2)条)。

See Resp. at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), and 982(a)(2)).

与郭文贵的主张相反,其被定罪罪行的范围,并非由个别受害人对其陈述的“预期和信赖”所界定。

Contrary to Guo’s claims, the scope of his crimes of conviction is not defined by the “expectations and reliance” of individual victims on his statements.

比较异议书第5页(主张“个别投资者的预期和信赖,是区分欺诈受害人与未受侵害者的关键”)。

Cf. Objs. at 5 (claiming that “individual investors’ expectations and reliance are critical to distinguishing between victims of fraud and those who were not victimized”).

事实上,第二巡回上诉法院已裁定,“信赖并非刑事欺诈的构成要件”,且“欺诈受害人信赖(或不信赖)虚假陈述是否不合理,与被告的犯罪故意无关”。

Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that “reliance is not an element of criminal fraud” and that “the unreasonableness of a fraud victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does not bear on a defendant’s criminal intent.”

United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2017)。

United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2017).

即使欺诈计划中所谓的“投资者”否认曾信赖构成欺诈基础的虚假陈述,欺诈计划仍可能成立,而从该计划取得的全部收益均应予没收。

In other words, even if an alleged “investor” in a fraudulent scheme disclaims that they relied on the false statements which underpinned the fraud, a fraudulent scheme may nonetheless exist, and all proceeds obtained from such a scheme would be subject to forfeiture.

同样,“投资者”对于自身是否为该计划受害人的主观看法,并不影响其投入该计划的资金是否属于被告从欺诈中取得的“收益”。

Relatedly, an “investor[’s]” subjective views as to whether they are victims of the scheme have no bearing on whether their contributions to the scheme are “proceeds” that a defendant has obtained from fraud.

决定性因素仅在于“重大性”,即被指控具有欺诈性的陈述,是否“具有影响其所针对决策者的自然倾向”。

All that matters is “materiality”—that the statements alleged to be fraudulent have the “natural tendency to influence the decisionmakers to whom they were addressed.”

Weaver, 860 F.3d at 96。

Weaver, 860 F.3d at 96.

重大性应依客观标准评估,“而非从受害人的主观角度”判断。

And materiality is evaluated under an objective test, “rather than from the subjective perspective of the victim.”

United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017)。

United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017).

郭文贵被判有罪的欺诈罪行的法定定义,进一步印证了本院的结论。

The Court’s conclusion is confirmed by the statutory definitions of the fraud crimes of conviction.

电汇欺诈罪将明知而参与任何“欺诈计划或手段”,并“为实施此类〔欺诈〕计划或手段”而通过电信传输特定通信的行为规定为犯罪。

Wire fraud criminalizes the knowing participation in any “scheme or artifice to defraud” and the transmittal by wire of certain communications for “the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice [to defraud].”

《美国法典》第18编第1343条;参见2024年7月9日庭审记录第5791页第25行至第5794页第6行,ECF第450号。

18 U.S.C. § 1343; see July 9, 2024 Trial Tr. at 5791:25– 5794:6, ECF No. 450.

就证券欺诈而言,本案所违反的美国证券交易委员会(“SEC”)规则,参见第三份替代起诉书第47、51段,禁止使用“欺诈……计划”、“作出有关重大事实的不实陈述”或在特定情形下遗漏重大事实,亦禁止“从事对任何人构成或将构成欺诈或欺骗的行为、做法或业务活动”。《联邦法规汇编》第17编第240.10b-5(a)—(c)条(着重号为本院所加)。

As for securities fraud, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule violated in this case, see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 47, 51, prohibits using a “scheme . . . to defraud,” “mak[ing] an untrue statement of material fact” or omitting a material fact in certain circumstances, or “engaging in an act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c) (emphasis added).

另见Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999)(指出国会在欺诈法规中禁止的是“‘欺诈计划’,而非已经完成的欺诈”)。

See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (observing that Congress prohibited the “‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud,” in the fraud statutes).

因此,郭文贵欺诈计划的“范围”,并不取决于每一位向该计划投入资金的人是否认为自己受到欺诈。

In other words, the “scope” of Guo’s fraudulent schemes does not depend on whether each individual making contributions to those schemes believed they were defrauded.

他们对于个人“投资”是否具有实质价值,或是否实际信赖任何重大虚假陈述的看法,均不影响这些投资是否投向了欺诈计划。〔脚注5〕

Their beliefs as to whether their individual “investments” had material value, or as to whether they in fact relied on any material misrepresentations, do not affect whether those investments were made in a fraudulent scheme.5

郭文贵援引的United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993)及United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024)两案,均与本案情形不符。

The cases cited by Guo, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993), and United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024), are inapposite.

在Miller案中,第二巡回上诉法院裁定,根据邮政欺诈审判中呈现的事实,政府未能证明被告意图剥夺受害人的财产权益,因为被告被指从受害人处转作“自身利益”的财产,实际上原本就不是属于受害人的“一项特定、可识别的财产权益”。

In Miller, the Second Circuit held that the Government failed to prove that the defendants intended to deprive a victim of a property interest on the facts shown at a trial for mail fraud because the property that the defendants had allegedly diverted “to their own benefit” from the victims was not, in fact, “a specific, identifiable property interest” belonging to the victims in the first place.

同上,第1017—1021页。

Id. at 1017– 1021.

Miller案最终取决于所谓受害人的合同财产权益范围,而非其预期或认知,因此与本案无关。

Miller, in other words, turned ultimately on the scope of the alleged victims’ contractual property interests, not on their expectations or beliefs, and, therefore, has no bearing here.

参见同上。

See id.

在Rainford案中,地区法院仅以“政府的一面之词”为依据作出没收令,上诉法院因而撤销该令并发回重审。

Rainford vacated and remanded a forfeiture order where a district court based its order solely on “the government’s word.”

110 F.4th at 489。

110 F.4th at 489.

本案则有充分证据支持已入卷的没收预备令。

Here, by contrast, there is ample evidence supporting the POF filed in this case.

郭文贵另主张,“有充分证据表明,相当数量的所谓‘受害人’不接受这一身份认定”。

Guo further argues that there is “abundant proof that a considerable number of supposed ‘victims’ reject that classification.”

异议书第6—7页。

Objs. at 6–7.

郭文贵称,“喜马拉雅交易所的6,512名会员”“已对没收其账户提出异议”,并“对被贴上受害人的标签表示不满”;郭文贵因该企业的相关行为,被判第11项电汇欺诈罪名成立。

He claims that “6,512 members of the Himalaya Exchange” (the enterprise for which Guo was convicted of wire fraud in Count Eleven) “have objected to forfeiture of their accounts” and “express[] frustration at being labeled as victims.”

同上,第6页。

Id. at 6.

这些意见,以及“Hamilton申请人”和其他各类第三方的意见,均不影响本命令;本命令仅审理政府指明的财产事实上是否属于敲诈勒索活动的收益、欺诈收益,或可追溯至洗钱所涉资金,以及13亿美元的金钱判决是否为对郭文贵没收义务金额所作的合理估算。〔脚注6〕

These complaints, as well as those from the “Hamilton petitioners” and various other third parties, do not affect this order, which addresses solely whether the properties identified by the Government are, in fact, either proceeds of racketeering activity, proceeds of fraud, or traceable to funds involved in money laundering, and whether the $1.3 billion money judgment is a reasonable estimate of the value of Guo’s forfeiture obligations. 6

第三方就没收预备令所列财产主张的权利,应依《美国法典》第18编第853(n)条及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2条,通过附属程序审查。

Third-parties’ alleged claims to the property identified in the POF shall be assessed through ancillary proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2.

B. 占有B. Possession

郭文贵主张,“仅在其曾于某一时点亲自取得涉案收益的范围内,方可令其承担没收该等收益价值的责任”,并基于多项理由认为,尚无充分证据证明其“取得”了没收预备令列明的财产。

Guo argues that he “can only be held liable to forfeit the value of tainted proceeds to the extent that he at some point personally obtained them,” and that, for various reasons, there is insufficient evidence that he “obtained” the property listed in the POF.

异议书第10—11页(着重号为原文所有)。

Objs. at 10–11 (emphasis in original).

郭文贵误解了没收的性质。

Guo misunderstands the nature of forfeiture.

被告犯罪收益可予没收,并不要求相关财产“由被告、其受让人或其共谋者亲自或直接占有”。

For proceeds of a defendant’s crime to be forfeitable, the property “need not be personally or directly in the possession of the defendant, his assignees, or his co-conspirators.”

United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2012)(引注略)。

United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

该财产只须“在某一时点曾受被告控制”。

Instead, the property need only “have, at some point, been under the defendant’s control.”

同上。

Id.

此外,即使被告仅暂时控制财产,该财产仍可予没收。

Further, property may be forfeited even when the defendant’s control over the property is temporary.

参见United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019)。

See United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).

庭审中,政府已依优势证据标准证明,郭文贵是掌控G企业全部实体及其资产的“老板”。

At trial, the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo was the “Boss” in control of all of the entities in the G Enterprise and those entities’ assets.

答复书第7页。〔脚注7〕

Resp. at 7. 7

例如,多名证人的证言表明郭文贵对G企业所涉资产行使控制权:卡琳·迈斯特雷洛(Karin Maistrello)作证称,郭文贵控制法治组织的资金,该计划属于G企业的一部分(参见庭审记录第424页);多名证人作证称,郭文贵控制G Clubs(参见庭审记录第1941页〔称郭文贵为“最高老板”〕、第1995页第3—15行、第1996页第2—5行〔在法官席旁作出的澄清〕、第1999页第4—7行、第2975页第8行至第2976页第10行、第2980页第11—22行、第2999页第20行至第3000页第6行〔有关G Clubs的证言〕);另有大量书证支持郭文贵对其犯罪所涉资金行使控制权的结论(参见GXC415;答复书第7页脚注3〔援引显示郭文贵对G企业所涉资金行使控制权的庭审证物〕)。〔脚注8〕

For example, testimony from several witnesses shows that Guo exercised control over assets involved in the G Enterprise: Karin Maistrello testified that Guo was in control of the Rule of Law organizations’ funds, a scheme involved in the G Enterprise (see Trial Tr. at 424); multiple witnesses testified that Guo had control over G Clubs (see Trial Tr. at 1941 (describing Guo as the “top boss”), 1995:3–15, 1996:2–5 (clarification at sidebar), 1999:4–7, 2975:8–2976:10, 2980:11–22, 2999:20–3000:6 (testimony concerning G Clubs)); and abundant documentary evidence supports the conclusion that Guo exercised control over the funds involved in his crimes (see GXC415; Resp. at 7 n.3 (citing trial exhibits depicting Guo exercising control over funds involved in the G Enterprise)). 8

庭审中出示的书证,例如GXZ26(显示从G企业某些银行账户流向没收预备令所列其他银行账户的现金流),亦证明政府主张应予没收的特定账户中,包含源自G企业收益的资金及洗钱所涉财产。

The documentary evidence introduced at trial, see, e.g., GXZ26 (showing cash flows from certain G Enterprise bank accounts into other bank accounts which are listed in the POF), also establishes that the particular accounts that the Government argues are subject to forfeiture contain funds derived from proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering.

参见动议第4—5页。

See Mot. at 4–5.

郭文贵并未主张这些账户内存在并非源自G企业所涉实体的资金。

Notably, Guo does not argue that the funds in these accounts hold money which is not derived from entities involved in the G Enterprise.

参见没收预备令第a—z、bb段;异议书第9—11页(仅主张其本人未取得或控制这些资金)。

See POF ¶¶ a–z, bb; Objs. at 9–11 (instead arguing solely that he did not personally obtain or exercise control over these funds).

郭文贵主要依据Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017)一案,支持其关于不得命令其“交出本人〔未〕取得的资产予以没收”的主张。

Guo relies in substantial part on Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), to support his argument that he cannot be ordered to “forfeit assets that he [did not] personally obtain[].”

异议书第9页。

Obj. at 9.

在该案中,最高法院裁定,《美国法典》第21编第853条虽然要求没收源自某些毒品犯罪收益的任何财产,但并不自动使共谋中所有被定罪者承担连带责任。

In that case, the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 853, which requires forfeiture of any property derived from proceeds of certain drug crimes, does not automatically impose joint and several liability on all convicted parties of a conspiracy.

参见581 U.S. at 443。

See 581 U.S. at 443.

在Honeycutt案中,政府请求对被告作出金钱判决,主张其应对共谋活动的全部利润承担责任,尽管该被告仅为一名领薪雇员,曾协助其所在商店参与毒品犯罪,却从未从该商店相应的涉案利润中受益,更未对其行使控制权。

In Honeycutt, the government sought a money judgment against a defendant, arguing that he was liable for the entirety of a conspiracy’s profits, even though the defendant was merely a salaried employee who had assisted his store’s participation in a drug crime, and never benefited from, let alone exercised control over, the extent of the store’s tainted profits.

参见同上,第445—447页。

See id. at 445–47.

而在本案中,本院依优势证据标准认定,郭文贵曾从政府主张应予没收的资金中受益,并对其行使控制权。

Here, however, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo benefitted from and exercised control over the funds that the Government maintains are subject to forfeiture.

参见例如答复书第7—8页脚注3(援引庭审证据,其中例如指出,郭文贵指示共谋者使用“G-Club或另一家私人公司”的资金购买一张昂贵的咖啡桌)。

See, e.g., Resp. at 7–8 n.3 (citing trial evidence noting, for example, that Guo directed his coconspirators to use “G-Club or another private company” to finance the purchase of an expensive coffee table).

事实上,自Honeycutt案以来,第二巡回上诉法院已重申,适用没收不要求政府证明被告曾亲自保有或直接占有财产。

Indeed, since Honeycutt, the Second Circuit has reiterated that the Government need not show that a defendant personally retained or directly possessed property for forfeiture to apply.

参见例如Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018)(裁定即使被告仅暂时有权支配相关资金,而资金随后已拨付,仍可就该资金对被告作出没收令)。

See, e.g., Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that a forfeiture order could be imposed against a defendant for funds over which the defendant only had temporary authority and which had subsequently been disbursed).

因此,本院认定,政府已依优势证据标准证明,所列财产应予没收。

The Court, therefore, finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Listed Property is subject to forfeiture.

C. GTV私募发行及美国证券交易委员会要求的吐出非法所得C. GTV Private Placement and SEC Disgorgement

郭文贵主张,源自GTV私募发行的资金不应列入没收令,且对其作出的金钱判决,应扣除政府指称涉及GTV的资金金额。

Guo argues that funds derived from the GTV Private Placement should not be included in the forfeiture order and that the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount of funds the Government alleges were involved in GTV.

参见异议书第17页。〔脚注9〕

See Objs. at 17.9

郭文贵认为,由于其就与GTV私募发行有关的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈罪名已被判无罪,政府请求没收的、源自GTV私募发行的4.11亿美元,应从没收令中剔除。

Guo contends that because he was acquitted of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private Placement, $411 million in funds derived from the GTV Private Placement that the Government seeks to forfeit should be excluded from the order.

同上,第11—12页;答复书第8页。

Id. at 11–12; Resp. at 8.

鉴于双方提出的另一问题,即对郭文贵作出的金钱判决是否应扣除美国证券交易委员会已在行政程序中追回的金额,本院无须裁定上述问题。

The Court need not resolve this in light of another issue raised by the parties: whether the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount already recovered by the SEC in administrative proceedings.

参见美国证券交易委员会命令,ECF第799-2号。

See SEC Order, ECF No. 799-2.

郭文贵称,GTV已在美国证券交易委员会发起的行政程序中吐出非法所得逾4.11亿美元。

Guo states that GTV has already disgorged in excess of $411 million as part of an administrative proceeding initiated by the SEC.

参见异议书第17—18页。

See Objs. at 17–18.

政府对此部分认可,称“GTV私募发行产生的实际资金,已由美国证券交易委员会追回;该委员会设立了公平基金,用于向受害人分配”,并表示“如本院从没收金额中扣除GTV私募发行资金,将扣除约4.11亿美元”。

The Government concedes this, in part, stating that “[t]he actual funds derived from the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement were recovered by the SEC, which established a fair fund for distribution to victims,” and that “[i]f the Court were to deduct the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement funds from the forfeiture amount, approximately $411 million would be deducted.”

动议第4页脚注2。

Mot. at 4 n.2.

但双方提出的金额并不一致。

However, the parties’ figures diverge.

郭文贵主张,GTV连同Saraca Media Group, Inc.和Voice of Guo Media, Inc.已向美国证券交易委员会吐出非法所得逾4.86亿美元,且由于该款项涉及本案起诉的行为,应从金钱判决中扣除全部4.86亿美元。

Guo argues that GTV, along with Saraca Media Group, Inc. and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., has disgorged over $486 million to the SEC and that the full $486 million should be deducted from the money judgment because it relates to conduct charged in this case.

参见异议书第18页。

See Objs. at 18.

政府则主张,13亿美元中仅4.11亿美元源自GTV私募发行,其余8.89亿美元源自可追溯至农场借贷计划、G Clubs或喜马拉雅交易所的收益。

The Government, however, contends that only $411 million of the $1.3 billion figure derives from the GTV Private Placement and that the remaining $889 million derives from proceeds traceable to the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange.

参见GXZ26。

See GXZ26.

GTV及其他实体吐出非法所得的金额比4.11亿美元多出7,500万美元这一事实,仅在该额外7,500万美元可追溯至本案所涉欺诈计划,即农场借贷计划、G Clubs或喜马拉雅交易所的收益时,才与金钱判决有关。

The fact that GTV and other entities disgorged $75 million more than $411 million is relevant to the money judgment only if the excess $75 million is traceable to proceeds from the fraudulent schemes involved in this case, namely, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange.

郭文贵主张,所称超出4.11亿美元的7,500万美元吐出非法所得款项,可追溯至其被定罪的罪行;本院驳回该主张。

The Court rejects Guo’s arguments that the purported $75 million disgorged in excess of $411 million is traceable to his crimes of conviction.

郭文贵首先称,吐出非法所得总额中有3,400万美元涉及“G币和G美元”的销售,这两者是喜马拉雅交易所的早期前身。

First, he claims that $34 million of the total disgorged funds relate to sales of “G-Coins and G-Dollars,” early precursors to the Himalaya Exchange.

参见异议书第17—18页。

See Objs. at 17–18.

然而,起诉书并未涵盖2020年4月至6月销售G币和G美元的行为,其针对的是2021年至2023年间发生的喜马拉雅交易所企业交易。

However, the sale of G-Coin and G-Dollars from April to June of 2020 is not covered by the Indictment, which targets the Himalaya Exchange enterprise transactions that took place from 2021 to 2023.

参见第三份替代起诉书第53段。

See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 53.

此外,郭文贵并未提供证据证明,归于Voice of Guo Media, Inc.(“VOG”)的1.15亿美元吐出非法所得款项“与所谓农场借贷计划重叠”。

Moreover, Guo provides no evidence that the $115 million in disgorged funds attributable to Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”) “overlaps with the so-called Farm Loan Program.”

异议书第17—18页。

Objs. at 17–18.

美国证券交易委员会命令记载,VOG汇集了希望向GTV投资少于100,000美元的“潜在投资者”的资金。

The SEC Order reports that VOG pooled funds from “prospective investors” who wanted to invest less than $100,000 in GTV.

参见异议书第17—18页;美国证券交易委员会命令第15—21段,ECF第799-2号。

See Objs. at 17–18; SEC Order ¶¶ 15–21, ECF No. 799-2.

但起诉书对农场借贷计划的描述,与美国证券交易委员会命令对VOG募资活动的描述存在重大差异。

The Indictment’s description of the Farm Loan Program, however, differs substantially from the SEC Order’s description of VOG’s fundraising efforts.

例如,比较第三份替代起诉书第17段(将“喜马拉雅农场联盟”描述为“分布于世界各地城市的非正式团体〔各称为‘农场’〕的集合”,其“以向农场提供‘借款’的形式”取得投资,并通过“借款协议”“承诺该等借款可转换为GTV普通股”)与美国证券交易委员会命令第16—18段(描述VOG如何向投资者提供一页纸的“有限目的代理协议”,规定VOG的一名代表收取极少对价,作为投资者的“代理人”代其购买GTV股票)。

Compare, e.g., S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 17 (describing “The Himalaya Farm Alliance” as “a collective of informal groups (each known as a ‘Farm’) located in various cities around the world” which obtained investments “in the form of ‘loans’ to a Farm” and “promising that such loans would be convertible into GTV common stock” via a “Loan Agreement”) with SEC Order ¶¶ 16–18 (describing how VOG would provide an investor a one-page “Limited Purpose Agency Agreement,” stating that, for minimal consideration, a representative of VOG would act as an “agent” for investors and purchase GTV stock on their behalf).

郭文贵指出,美国证券交易委员会从GTV及关联公司取得的款项比4.11亿美元多出7,500万美元,这一点虽属实,但其未能证明这笔超出部分与政府已证明关联于郭文贵被定罪罪行的任何收益重合,即关联于农场借贷计划、G Clubs及喜马拉雅交易所的收益。

Although Guo is correct that the SEC obtained $75 million more than $411 million from GTV and related companies, he has not shown that this surplus coincides with any of the proceeds that the Government has demonstrated are related to Guo’s crimes of conviction—that is, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange.

因此,本院认定,仅可从拟议金钱判决中扣除4.11亿美元,因为案卷表明——且政府并无异议——可追溯至GTV私募发行的4.11亿美元,在本刑事案件启动前,已由G企业的关联实体在另行程序中以吐出非法所得的方式缴付。

The Court concludes, therefore, that only $411 million may be deducted from the proposed money judgment, because the record reflects—and the Government does not contest— that $411 million in funds traceable to the GTV Private Placement has already been disgorged by entities related to the G Enterprise in separate proceedings prior to the commencement of this criminal case.

此项扣除不影响任何所列财产的没收。

This deduction does not affect the forfeiture of any of the Listed Property.

D. 抵扣D. Offsets

郭文贵主张,金钱判决金额应“扣除政府就本案已持有的逾10亿美元”,并抵扣“破产受托人持有且属于政府认为在本案可予没收项目的资金及资产”。

Guo argues that the money judgment should be “already offset by the more than $1 billion already in the Government’s possession in connection with this case” and by the “funds and assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee’s possession that are among the items the Government deems forfeitable in this case.”

异议书第18—20页。

Objs. at 18–20.

政府答复指出,在所有第三方权益均经裁判后,“根据没收终局令没收归美国所有”的财产价值,确实“将用于清偿金钱判决”,但对于没收预备令未涵盖的资产,并无法律依据命令予以抵扣。

In response, the Government notes that the value of property “forfeited to the United States under a Final Order of Forfeiture” will, indeed “be applied towards the satisfaction of the [m]oney [j]udgment” once all third-party interests are adjudicated, and that there is no authority to order an offset for any assets not covered by the POF.

参见答复书第10页及脚注7;没收预备令第7段。〔脚注10〕

See Resp. at 10 & n.7; POF ¶ 7.10

因此,本院目前不会从金钱判决中扣除任何所列财产的价值。〔脚注11〕

Accordingly, the Court will not deduct the value of any of the Listed Property from the money judgment at this time. 11

E. 附带事项E. Ancillary Matters

郭文贵还请求作出命令,指示政府从其破产财产的第11章破产受托人处接管若干资产(“破产资产”);该破产程序于2022年2月15日在康涅狄格地区启动。

Guo also seeks an order directing the Government to take possession of certain assets (the “bankruptcy assets”) from the Chapter 11 Trustee of Guo’s estate in bankruptcy proceedings, which were commenced on February 15, 2022, in the District of Connecticut.

参见扣押动议,ECF第724号,第1页;概括参见In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. 2022年2月15日);In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026)。

See Seizure Mot., ECF No. 724, at 1; see generally In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15, 2022); In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026).

郭文贵主张,政府对被没收资产的权益“优先于破产程序中任何债权人的权益”(扣押动议第5页);命令政府扣押破产资产,既可“将这些资产用于本案所涉各实体的投资者,且法院将命令向其作出刑事退赔”,又可“制止受托人在破产程序中产生的大量费用及开支继续累积”。

Guo argues that the Government’s interest in the forfeited assets is “superior to that of any creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding,” Seizure Mot. at 5, that ordering the Government to seize the bankruptcy assets will both “make them available to investors in the various entities involved in this case, and for whom restitution will be ordered” and “halt the accumulation of considerable fees and expenses incurred by the Trustee” in the bankruptcy proceeding.

参见同上,第5—7页。

See id. at 5–7.

本院无权准予郭文贵请求的救济。〔脚注12〕

The Court does not have the power to grant the relief Guo requests. 12

郭文贵仅援引《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(3)条,主张本院“可在”没收预备令中“列入……在任何上诉待决期间为保全财产价值而合理必要的条件”。

Guo merely cites Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(3) for the proposition that the Court “may include . . . conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal” in a preliminary order of forfeiture.

参见扣押动议回复书第4页,ECF第754号。

See Seizure Reply at 4, ECF No. 754.

第32.2(b)(3)条将本院的权限限于在“上诉”期间保全财产价值所需的条件,而非在相关但独立的程序——如本案涉及的破产程序——待决期间保全价值所需的条件。

Rule 32.2(b)(3) limits the Court’s authority to conditions required to preserve the property’s value on “appeal,” rather than conditions required to preserve value pending related, separate proceedings—like the bankruptcy proceeding here.

此外,没收规则的其他数项程序性规定也表明,作出此类命令将超出本院权限。

Furthermore, several other procedural features of the forfeiture rules indicate that such an order would exceed the Court’s power.

例如,第32.2(b)(3)条在没收预备令作出后,“授权”政府“扣押应予没收的特定财产”,但并未要求政府必须实施扣押。《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(3)条。

For example, Rule 32.2(b)(3) “authorizes” the Government “to seize the specific property subject to forfeiture” upon entry of a preliminary order but does not require that the Government do so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3).

第32.2条也未规定,政府依第32.2(b)(3)条获得授权后,可于何时或以何种方式扣押没收令所列财产。

Nor does Rule 32.2 state when, or how, the Government may seize property listed in a forfeiture order once it is authorized to do so under Rule 32.2(b)(3).

同样,《美国法典》第21编第853(e)及(f)条赋予本院权力,可就可能应予没收的资产采取特定保护措施,但未授权本院强制政府实施扣押。

Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) and (f) empower the Court to take certain protective measures concerning assets potentially subject to forfeiture, but do not authorize the Court to compel the Government to enact a seizure.

参见答复书第4页。

See Resp. at 4.

此外,郭文贵的请求并无实质依据。

Moreover, Guo’s request lacks merit.

郭文贵主张,本院可以施加“在任何上诉待决期间为保全财产价值而合理必要”的条件(扣押动议回复书第4页),但第32.2条并未要求本院必须如此行事。

Guo argues that the Court may impose conditions “reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal,” Seizure Reply at 4, but nothing in Rule 32.2 requires the Court to do so.

本院承认,该破产程序中的第11章破产财产已产生应付受托人及其他各类专业人员的费用,参见扣押动议第7页;但鉴于该程序极为复杂,此类费用并不罕见。

Although the Court acknowledges that the Chapter 11 Estate in the bankruptcy proceeding has incurred fees owed to the Trustee and various other professionals, see Seizure Mot. at 7, such fees are not unusual given the remarkable complexity of that proceeding.

参见同上(称破产程序中已提起300起对抗诉讼)。

See id. (claiming that 300 adversary proceedings have been filed in the bankruptcy proceeding).

F. 刑事退赔F. Restitution

政府请求本院认定,作出刑事退赔令不具可行性,并授权进行没收发还程序。

The Government requests that the Court find that imposing a restitution order would be impracticable and authorize a remission process.

参见政府函第4—5页,ECF第785号;ECF第784号(2026年1月8日命令)。

See Gov’t Ltr. at 4–5, ECF No. 785; ECF No. 784 (January 8, 2026 order).

郭文贵表示同意。

Guo agrees.

ECF第789号,第3页。

ECF No. 789 at 3.

本院亦予同意,并根据本案大量案卷记录认定,鉴于“本案的复杂性及所涉受害人的人数”,依《美国法典》第18编第3663A条向受害人判给刑事退赔并不现实,且会使量刑程序复杂化或延长该程序。

The Court agrees and finds, based on the extensive record in this case, that given the “complexity of the case and the number of victims involved,” awarding restitution to victims in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A would be impractical and would complicate or prolong the sentencing process.

参见《美国法典》第18编第3663(c)(3)(A)—(B)条。

See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B).

结论CONCLUSION

基于上述理由,本院认定,政府已证明,鉴于郭文贵被判敲诈勒索共谋罪、电汇欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪及共谋洗钱罪成立,所列财产应予没收。

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Government has demonstrated that forfeiture applies to the Listed Property due to Guo’s convictions for racketeering conspiracy, wire and securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering.

本院在以下范围内支持郭文贵的异议:从拟议的13亿美元金钱判决中扣除4.11亿美元,没收终局令中的金钱判决金额据此应为8.89亿美元。

The Court SUSTAINS Guo’s objections to the extent that the Court shall deduct $411 million from the $1.3 billion proposed money judgment, such that the money judgment in the final order of forfeiture shall be $889 million.

本院驳回郭文贵载于ECF第724号的动议,该动议请求作出命令,强制政府扣押破产程序中的资产。

The Court DENIES Guo’s motion at ECF No. 724 seeking an order compelling the Government to seize assets in the bankruptcy proceedings.

兹指示法院书记官将ECF第724号动议作结案处理。

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 724.

本院另认定,本案刑事退赔不具可行性,并授权政府通过没收发还程序补偿受害人。

Finally, the Court finds that restitution is impracticable in this case and authorizes the Government to compensate victims through a remission process.

特此命令。SO ORDERED.

日期:2026年6月29日 纽约州纽约市Dated: June 29, 2026 New York, New York

脚注1:起诉书在此项没收指控中还援引《美国法典》第28编第2461(c)条,该条规定了与没收有关的进一步规则及程序。

1. The Indictment also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) in this forfeiture allegation, which specifies further rules and procedures related to forfeiture.

参见第三份替代起诉书第59段。

See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 59.

脚注2:在依法须实行刑事没收的案件中,法院可以作出金钱判决。

2. Courts may impose money judgments in cases where criminal forfeiture is required.

如果被告资产或可识别财产不足以涵盖没收法规要求其交出予以没收的全部收益,可通过金钱判决确保被告对该全部收益承担责任。

Where a defendant’s assets or identifiable property may not cover the full amount of the proceeds that a forfeiture statute requires the defendant to forfeit, money judgments may be used to ensure that the defendant is held liable for the full amount of those proceeds.

参见例如United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)(“如被告缺乏足以履行该命令的资产,法院可作出有利于政府的没收金钱判决。”);United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)(在依据《美国法典》第18编第982(a)(2)条请求没收的案件中,维持金钱判决);United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010)(在依据《美国法典》第28编第2461条请求没收的案件中,维持金钱判决)。

See, e.g., United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“If the defendant lacks the assets to satisfy the order, the court can award the government a forfeiture money judgment.”); United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)); United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2461).

脚注3:政府主张,郭文贵已放弃对没收预备令提出任何异议,主要依据是郭文贵在2025年6月27日的函中称,其不就没收表明立场。

3. The Government argues that Guo has waived any challenges to the POF due largely to his statement in his June 27, 2025 letter that he was not taking a position as to forfeiture.

参见例如答复书第3—4页。

See, e.g., Resp. at 3–4.

本院1月8日的命令未处理权利放弃问题;鉴于本院在本命令中基本认定郭文贵对没收预备令的质疑缺乏实质依据,且本院倾向于就实体问题作出裁断,故不对郭文贵是否已放弃异议发表意见。

The Court’s January 8 order did not address waiver, and, because the Court largely concludes in this order that Guo’s challenges to the POF lack merit and prefers to decide the issues on the merits, the Court expresses no view on whether Guo waived his objections.

脚注4:郭文贵在量刑意见书中主张,证物GXZ26未考虑G企业各组成部分之间流入资金可能被重复计算的问题。

4. In his sentencing submission, Guo argues that exhibit GXZ26 does not account for the possible double-counting of inflows across various components of the G Enterprise.

参见例如ECF第822号,第41、53页(主张个人可以使用喜马拉雅交易所资金购买G Clubs会员资格);另见ECF第826号(更正量刑意见书)。

See, e.g., ECF No. 822 at 41,53 (claiming that individuals could use Himalaya Exchange funds to purchase a G Club membership); see also ECF No. 826 (correcting sentencing submission).

郭文贵未援引任何证据表明此类情况确已发生,或表明政府计算流入资金时,确实不当计入了从喜马拉雅交易所账户向G Clubs投入的资金。

Guo does not cite any evidence showing that this occurred, or suggesting that the Government’s inflow calculation in fact improperly included contributions made from Himalaya Exchange accounts to G Clubs.

同上。

Id.

因此,本院根据案卷中现有证据作出本项认定;该证据表明政府的计算正确。

The Court, therefore, makes this determination on the evidence available in the record, which demonstrates that the Government’s calculation is correct.

而且,无论如何,郭文贵在对没收令提出的异议中未提出此项论点。

And, in any event, this argument was not raised in Guo’s objections to the forfeiture order.

故本院不予审理此项异议。

As such, the Court will not address this objection.

脚注5:郭文贵并未提出相反主张——其提交文书中提出本项论点的部分,既未讨论,甚至未援引其被定罪的欺诈罪行的构成要件。

5. Guo does not argue otherwise—he neither discusses, nor even cites, the elements of his fraud convictions in the portion of his submission making this argument.

参见异议书第4—9页。

See Objs. at 4–9.

脚注6:本院知悉,已有大量申请依据《美国法典》第18编第853(n)条提出,旨在就没收归美国所有的财产主张第三方法律权益;对于任何申请人依第853(n)条适当提出并提交的权利主张是否成立,本院不发表意见。

6. The Court acknowledges the voluminous petitions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) seeking to assert a third-party’s legal interest in property forfeited to the United States, and the Court expresses no opinion as to whether any petitioner’s claim, properly made and submitted under § 853(n), is meritorious.

脚注7:此外,依据本案作为没收依据的各项法规,本院仅须认定郭文贵“直接或间接”取得收益。

7. Additionally, under each statute serving as the basis for forfeiture in this case, the Court need only find that Guo obtained the proceeds “directly or indirectly.”

参见《美国法典》第18编第1963(a)(3)、981(a)(2)(A)、982(a)(2)条。

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3), 981(a)(2)(A), 982(a)(2).

脚注8:郭文贵关于庭审记录的唯一论点是,某证人“作证称……郭文贵并非G Clubs的最终实益拥有人,也不是G Clubs或G Fashion的资金来源”。

8. Guo’s sole argument regarding the trial record is that one witness “testified that . . . Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of G Clubs, nor was he the source of funds for G Clubs or G Fashion.”

异议书第10—11页。

Objs. at 10–11.

该证人小詹姆斯·R·柯林斯(James R. Collins Jr.)是Mercantile Global Holdings的雇员;该公司拥有一家银行,该银行与G Clubs、G Fashion和喜马拉雅交易所保持客户关系。

That witness, James R. Collins Jr., was an employee at Mercantile Global Holdings, a company which owned a bank that maintained client relationships with G Clubs, G Fashion, and the Himalaya Exchange.

参见庭审记录第2753页第8行至第2756页第15行。

See Trial Tr. at 2753:8– 2756:15.

但柯林斯仅作证称,Mercantile Bank认为郭文贵并非G Clubs的最终实益拥有人,且G Clubs曾向其作出此种表示。

But Collins only testified that Mercantile Bank believed that Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of G Clubs and that G Clubs had represented as much to him.

参见庭审记录第2758页第23行至第2762页第12行。

See Trial Tr. at 2758:23–2762:12.

其并未就G Clubs内部运作的任何亲身了解作证,也未就郭文贵事实上是否控制G Clubs资金作证。

He did not testify as to any personal knowledge of the inner workings of G Clubs, or whether Guo, in fact, exercised control over G Clubs funds.

因此,本院对柯林斯证言赋予的证明力极低。

The Court, therefore, accords Collins’ testimony minimal weight.

郭文贵还试图通过援引,将第三方提出的论点纳入其主张;这些第三方已依据《美国法典》第21编第853(n)条,就应予没收的资产提出附属权利请求。

Guo also attempts to incorporate by reference arguments made by third parties who have filed ancillary claims to assets subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).

参见异议书第11页。

See Objs. at 11.

本院将在量刑后依第853(n)条及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2条进行的附属程序中审理这些论点。

The Court will consider those arguments as part of the ancillary proceedings that shall be conducted after sentencing pursuant to §853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2.

本院不对任何第三方是否就任何被没收财产享有优先法律权益发表意见。

The Court expresses no opinion as to whether any third party has a superior legal interest in any forfeited property.

脚注9:郭文贵并未主张某一特定银行账户或动产项目仅构成GTV私募发行的收益,概括参见异议书。

9. Guo does not claim that a specific bank account, or item of personal property, solely constitutes proceeds from the GTV Private Placement, see generally Objs.

政府坚持认为,所有相关资金均为G企业的收益及洗钱所涉财产。

The Government maintains that all of the relevant funds are proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering.

参见动议第4—5页。

See Mot. at 4–5.

郭文贵未主张应以此为由将任何所列财产排除在没收范围之外,因此,本院仅审查吐出非法所得对金钱判决的影响。

Guo does not argue that any of the Listed Property should be excluded from forfeiture on this basis, and the Court, therefore, only examines how the disgorgement affects the money judgment.

脚注10:郭文贵还主张,如果本院在附属程序中认定某项财产属于第三方,应从金钱判决中扣除该财产价值。

10. Guo also argues that if the Court finds, in ancillary proceedings, that any property belongs to a third party, the value of that property should be deducted from the money judgment.

异议书第18页。

Objs. at 18.

此项主张不成立。

Not so.

第三方没收程序旨在确定第三方是否对应予没收的财产享有优先法律权益。

Third-party forfeiture proceedings are designed to determine if a third party possesses a superior legal interest in the property subject to forfeiture.

参见《美国法典》第21编第853(n)(6)条;政府没收事宜函第1—2页,ECF第785号。

See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); Gov’t Forfeiture Ltr. at 1–2, ECF No. 785.

这与资产是否可予没收属于不同问题。

That is a separate question from whether the assets are forfeitable.

即使第三方对财产享有优先法律权益,该财产仍可能已因欺诈等原因落入郭文贵控制之下。

Property may well have come under Guo’s control due to, for example, fraud, even though a third party possessed a superior legal interest in that property.

因此,如本院依《美国法典》第21编第853(n)(6)条认定某项财产属于第三方,也不会从金钱判决中扣除该财产的价值。

Therefore, if the Court finds that any property belongs to a third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), it will not deduct the value of that property from the money judgment.

脚注11:本院驳回郭文贵提出的以下请求:按照“政府未追索本案其他可能可予没收资产的范围”减少金钱判决金额,以及按海瑟姆·哈立德(Haithem Khaled)被没收的金额减少金钱判决金额。

11. The Court denies Guo’s request to reduce the money judgment “to the extent the Government has declined to pursue other potentially forfeitable assets in this case,” and to reduce the money judgment by the amount forfeited by Haithem Khaled.

参见异议书第19—21页。

See Objs. at 19–21.

郭文贵未为上述任何一项请求提供法律依据。

Guo offers no legal basis for either of these requests.

脚注12:对于政府关于郭文贵就此问题不具诉讼资格的主张,本院不发表意见。

12. The Court expresses no opinion on the Government’s argument that Guo lacks standing on this issue.